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It has been claimed that quantum mechanics, unlike classical mechanics, allows for free 
will. In this paper I articulate that claim and explain how a complex physical system 
possessing fractal-like self similarity could exhibit both self consciousness and self deter-
mination. I use complexity theory to show how quantum mechanical indeterminacies at 
the neural level (as postulated by Eccles and Penrose) could "percolate up" to the levels 
of scale within the brain at which sensory-motor information transformations occur. 
Finally, I explain how macro level indeterminacy could be coupled with self determina-
tion to provide a physical system with the capacity for radically free willing. 
• According to an important tradition of thought in the West, human beings 
determine their own actions in a "radically free" manner. The concept of a 
radically free will was understood as essentially an undetermined ability to 
choose between options. Such an idea, though intimated by Aristotle 
(Eudemian Ethics 1223a), was absent from typical ancient Greek attempts to 
explain the origination of human action (Dihle, 1982; Macintyre, 1986). 
The position was fully developed during the middle ages within the world-
view that centered on a creator God who causes the whole universe to exist 
and whose act of creating is self determined and utterly free. Secular thinkers 
of the enlightenment era re-interpreted the will's freedom to be much less 
radical than as in the older biblically-based view. In his discussion "Of 
Liberty and Necessity," Hume (1739/1964, Book II Part III Section II) 
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referred to this newer notion of the will's freedom as "liberty of spontaneity" 
and to the older religiously motivated view as "liberty of indifference" 
(Kenny, 1973, esp. pp. 97-112). The problem with the biblical view which 
precipitated the emergence and eventual predomination of the new liberty of 
spontaneity interpretation was that the doctrine of radical freedom appeared 
to contradict the modern powerful mechanistic understanding of the physical 
universe. Whether or not there really is any deep contradiction between 
classical mechanics and the will's radical freedom, the thinkers of the 
enlightenment certainly believed there to be this antagonism. Moreover, the 
same idea is prevalent today in spite of twentieth century developments in 
our physical understanding of the universe that apparently obviate the con-
flict. Here I will show how the contradiction can be overcome by employing 
complexity theory and quantum mechanics to characterize a physical system 
that could exercise radically free will. Compton (1935) argued along these 
lines fairly early in the development of quantum mechanics. He did not 
attempt, as I do here, to articulate a specific mechanism through which 
quantum mechanical indeterminacies could emerge at macroscopic levels of 
scale. The resulting account is non-dualistic in the sense that no spiritual 
entity beyond the physical world needs to be posited in order to accommo-
date, within a thoroughly naturalistic science, both the experiential sense of 
radically free agency and the correlative concept of a radically free will. 
I begin my efforts by clarifying this concept of radically free agency. Then I 
characterize the various mental capacities required for self determination. Using 
complexity theory and fractal geometry, I next show how the human system of 
nerve cells could possess these capacities. In the following part of the paper, I 
use quantum mechanics and complexity theory to describe how atomic/sub-
atomic indeterminacies in nerve cell activity could "percolate up" to the level 
of scale at which radically free willing obtains. I follow this, again using basic 
ideas from fractal geometry, with an explanation of the sense in which an inde-
terministic nervous system could yet be self determining. I conclude the paper 
with remarks on the empirical verifiability of my interpretations. 
The Traditional Doctrine of the Radically Free Will 
Both the liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of indifference conceptions 
of the will's freedom presuppose that willing is self determination. This 
means that when a person wills a bodily action, the principle of the resulting 
action is within the agent instead of being external to the person. Actions 
like this are ascribable to the person as "doer" only in so far as three condi-
tions are fulfilled. First, the agent must be aware of what he is doing. If this 
condition is not fulfilled then the behavior that ensues is not caused by the 
individual as a conscious agent. The principle of the activity would be exter-
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nal to the person. In addition to knowing how his body is moving, the agent 
must be the cause of that behavior. In other words, either his desires or his 
acts of will must bring about his bodily activity. If something else (for 
instance, someone else's desire or act of will) causes the behavior then it is 
not ascribable to that person as doer. Finally, for an action to be self deter-
mined it must be "self referentially caused" (Donagan, 1987, chapter five; 
and Searle, 1983, chapters three and four) or, in the language of psychoanal-
ysis, must be "ego-syntonic." This means that when I determine my own act, 
I will (or want) the action to occur as a result of my willing (or wanting). Part 
of the content of an act of will (or desire) is that the willed action be caused 
by that act of will (that desire). For instance, if I will (or desire) to raise my 
arm in order to attract someone's attention then what I am choosing (or 
wanting) is that my arm rise by my willing (or desiring). If my arm goes up 
because of some other cause, for example, someone lifts my arm up at just the 
right moment, then even if I am aware of what I am doing and will (or want) 
to do it, my behavior does not occur as I will (or want) it to occur. Again, 
the principle of the action would be external to me. 
Clear cut examples of actions brought about by external principles include 
being physically forced into action by other people or being moved to act by 
forces of nature acting on one's body. Less clear examples of external causes 
are "ego-alien" compulsions and "irresistible" impulses. Even less clear exam-
ples of actions that are not self determined are habitual actions, that is, ones 
that were initially deliberately determined by oneself, now occur automati-
cally outside awareness and yet could readily be made objects of conscious 
choice. Though the distinction between internal and external sources of 
action is difficult to articulate in theory and difficult to discern in certain 
practical situations, it is based on a ready intuition: willed actions flow from 
myself. 1 In the language of phenomenology, willed actions exhibit "interior-
ity." Behavior which is not willed is determined "from without," not by the 
agent, and may be "ego-dystonic." Two quite different interpretations of the 
freedom in this self determination have been developed. Moreover, these 
interpretations are concomitant with different conceptions of the measure of 
interiority (syntonicity?) of willed action. 
According to Hume's liberty as spontaneity conception of freedom, a freely 
willed action occurs when the act is in accord with what a person wants to 
do. In effect, the action flows spontaneously from the agent's desires. A 
person acts unfreely, on this view, when in addition to her desire to do what 
she is doing, she also has a very strong desire to do something else. For exam-
ple, if she dines with the Jones family on Thursday night, but also strongly 
1For very illuminating discussions of these issues see Donagan (1982) and Kenny (1978). The 
relevant passages in Aristotle are at Nicomachean Ethics lllOa. 
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wants to remain at home to work on a project, then she will regard herself as 
acting unfreely, as under duress, as "torn." If it is not the case that she would 
rather be doing something else and just really wants to be dining with the 
Joneses then she will take herself to be acting freely. Hume argued that this 
way of conceiving of freedom is quite compatible with determinism (compat-
ibilism) since the strongest desire always causes the agent to act (or at least 
try to act). And Hume (and Dennett, 1984; and Spinoza, 1677/1992) further 
claimed that if someone thinks his action is not determined to occur and is 
free in some radical way then that is simply due to his being unaware of the 
cause of his act (which is always the strongest desire in the case of a self 
determined action). 
Action is self determined on this conception of human freedom because 
the desire which causes the action is the agent's own, the agent is aware of 
that desire and wants that desire to be the cause of the act. This admits of 
degrees to the extent that the agent's awareness of her own desire admits of 
degrees and to the extent that the agent wants to be moved by the desire that 
in fact motivates her. The less aware the agent is of her own desire that 
causes her to act, the less the action is her own - something unknown to 
her is causing her to act. The more conflicted is the agent about the desire 
that causes her to act, the less is the act her own. In this case she is torn 
between two desires - the desire that in fact motivates her and another 
desire that she not be so motivated. Often this conflict causes the self refer-
ential content of the original desire to act (i.e., that the action occur by that 
desire) to become explicit in consciousness. When a person is torn in this 
way only a part of her own self determines what she eventually does. The 
principle of the action resides within the agent in the fullest sense when the 
agent is fully aware of her desire that causes her to act and she fully wants 
that desire to cause her action (Frankfurt, 1981). It is important to note that 
on this view, self determination obtains even if the desires which cause the 
action are causally determined in their turn and no "break in the causal 
nexus" occurs. The simple fact that the person's desire intervenes between 
that which causes the desire and the person's action (which is proximately 
caused by the desire), suffices to render that action self determined. 
This understanding of freedom accords well with a common intuition 
about our own actions - we feel most free when we are doing what we most 
want to do and have no strong desire to do something else. The view was 
adopted by Hume and the British associationists and utilitarians. As 
Goldman argues, it seems to be the understanding of human action presup-
posed by game theory, choice theory, economic science and most of twentieth 
century psychology (Goldman, 1970, chapter five; cf. Davidson, 1980b; and 
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, chapter one, sections 2 and 4). This 
conception was originally developed in light of seventeenth/eighteenth cen-
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tury mechanistic theories of the natural world and ever since has been associ-
ated with deterministic metaphysics. 
Champions of Hume's liberty as indifference conception of the will's free-
dom take at face value that we do not experience the reasons for our behavior 
as causally sufficient for our actions (Searle, 2000). Because of this causal 
insufficiency of reasons for action, there is a causal indifference (indeterminacy) 
between what the individual does and his doing something else. Accordingly, 
on this view, the action of a person is freely willed if it is within the agent's 
power (or ability or capacity) to act otherwise. If I freely dine with the Jones 
family then it is within my power to do something else, even if this other act 
is minimally understood as the act of omitting to dine with them. Action 
occurs only if a person wills it, but it is within the person's power to will the 
action or not. Hence, on this conception, there are not necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for willing a specific action to the exclusion of others since 
if there were, then I could not really do anything else. This led Hume to 
claim that such an understanding of freedom is incompatible with determin-
ism (incompatibilism). Any deterministic network of causes would be sun-
dered by the freely willed actions of human agents. 
Within this view of volition the person's desires (wants, needs, drives, 
impulses, appetites, etc.) are taken to incline a person to will an action 
(inclinations), but not so much as to determine the action to occur. In a sense, 
the individual's desires and his beliefs about how to satisfy those desires form 
a set of motives of conduct from among which the person selects by a free act 
of will. This entails that the strongest desire or the most powerful motive 
never of itself issues into freely willed action (Descartes, 1649/1989, articles 
41-47; Leibniz, 1707/1951). 
Action is self determined on this interpretation of freedom in ways parallel 
to those noted in connection with the spontaneity conception of freedom -
the agent is aware of the action she chooses and wills that the action occur 
by her choice. Of course, any desire which inclines the agent to the act is 
also her desire. Hence, if she freely chooses to act as prompted by this incen-
tive then the self determination of her action which is due to the fact that 
the desire is hers is added to the self determination of the action which is due 
to her choosing to act in the way prompted by her desire. This indicates that 
within the indifference conception of freedom action is self determined in 
the further sense that the person herself determines her own behavior. Self 
determination, in this added sense, can be readily characterized using tradi-
tional metaphysical concepts - the "substantial" self causes itself to possess 
an "accident" or property, that is, the action (Crosby, 1996, chapter three; 
Korsgaard, 1989). In doing this, the substantial self may cause itself to possess 
a property that it is already disposed to possess by another of its own proper-
ties, that is, any desire the person might have to do the freely chosen deed. In 
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the same terms, according to the liberty of spontaneity conception, the sub-
stantial self is caused to possess a property (the action) by another of its own 
properties (a desire). The self is functioning at most as a conveyance of causal 
influences (instead of as a primary initiating source of causal influence). 2 
In sum, according to this conception of radical freedom, the will is a psy-
chological faculty or power by which a person acts.3 An act is self determined 
in the sense that the activation of this ability (actual willing) is determined 
to occur by the agent whose capacity it is. An act is free in the sense that the 
agent is not determined to exercise the capacity and is not determined to not 
exercise that capacity, in any situation in which its activation (action) is 
possible. This interpretation of the will's freedom accords well with our intu-
ition, when doing a deed, that it is within our capacity to stop what we are 
doing and head off in some other direction. It is also quite compatible with 
our intuition that supports the liberty of spontaneity conception - that we 
are most free when doing what we most want to do. The indifference view 
has been held in various forms by Anselm, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Descartes, 
Leibniz, Reid, and Kant. Though the conception has not been popular in this 
century it has had its adherents and has enjoyed something of a revival in 
recent decades (Bishop, 1983; Campbell, 1967; Chisholm, 1966; Donagan, 
1987; Greenwood, 1988; Kane, 1994, 1996; all of the articles in part II of 
O'Connor, 1995; and Taylor, 1966, 1979). 
Duns Scotus claimed that this type of agency is unique in the natural 
world since all other powers of action necessarily are activated in the pres-
ence of their appropriate "triggers" (Roberts, 1973; Wolter, 1990). Though 
human beings might be unique in this respect they are clearly not unique in 
being physical, material, bodily beings. Hence, the question arises: How 
could the bodily nature of human beings allow for this type of free action 
which is self determined and yet also undetermined? In what follows I 
attempt to show how a material object like the human nervous system could 
possess this apparently contradictory ability. 
2In these formulations the concept of self or substantial self need not be understood as refer-
ring to some immaterial or trans-physical entity. On either view of the will's freedom, a sub-
stance can be regarded simply as that which exists in itself and bears properties. An accident 
or property is simply that which exists in something else. In these senses, any individual 
human being is a substance and the actions and desires of that human being are features of 
the substance. This does not entail that human beings or any other substances have absolute 
self subsistence. The substances that exist in this universe might exist in themselves only rela-
tive to the set of laws that constitute this system of nature and only relative to very specific 
conditions within this system. Also, substances do not exist simply as such - what actually 
exists are substances and all of their properties. Hence, an individual existing human self, a 
referent for the indexical first person pronoun, "I," is both the bearer of properties and all of 
those properties. 
3For a superb contemporary formulation of the traditional concept of a causal power see chap-
ter five of Harre and Madden (197 5). 
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The Complex Bodily Nature of Human Beings 
From a naturalistic perspective, any thing capable of determining its own 
activities would have to be a structured system of physical stuff since neither 
unstructured "clumps" of matter nor uncompounded material elements pos-
sess such a capacity. It follows that the problem is to characterize the organi-
zation matter must have in order for a thing to have the power of self 
determination. Solving this task involves isolating the component functional 
abilities that are exercised in self determined activity and showing how an 
arrangement of material elements could have these constituent capabilities. 
Fortunately, neuroscience has revealed the human nervous system to have a 
functional structure that allows it to possess the requisite component abilities 
and hence to be capable of self determined activity.4 
The whole nervous system is a complex organization of nerve cells.5 The 
parts of this system, 100,000,000,000 neurons, are all connected to each 
other directly or indirectly, each neuron being connected on average to 1000 
other neurons (for a total of 100,000,000,000,000 connectivities). These ele-
4Contemporary attempts to understand both human neurophysiology and human psychology 
are formulated in information theoretic terms. The hope is that using this theory in both 
domains will provide a basis for identifying mentalistic accounts of human behavior with physi-
ological descriptions. The theory of information, originally developed by Shannon, Weaver, 
Wiener, MacKay etc, is a quantitative articulation of Aristotle's roughly hewn concept of the 
formal cause (as MacKay, 1980, pointed out; see also Dechert, 1965). Aristotle argued that any 
thing which changes (i.e., any physical thing) must be a composite of form and matter. The 
human being is a type of composite-the soul is the form and the body is the matter ("the soul 
is the form of the body"). Hence, the soul is the formal cause of the actions of a human being 
as a composite. This means that changes in the organization of the matter are to be explained 
in terms of the organization of that matter and not only in terms of the matter so organized. 
This is an abstract formulation of the cuttent paradigm that informs cognitive neuro-science, 
namely, that the changes human beings bring about and undergo are to be described and 
explained as information transformations (for two interesting examples see Goldberg, 1998; 
Sayre, 1976). It is worth noting that this general framework is metaphysically dualistic. 
Information states and structures are different from their carriers or vehicles. The same infor-
mation can be carried by (or embodied in or instantiated in) very different mediums. However, 
this dualism is not (or not necessarily) non-natural - the human being is a physical entity 
composed of matter and form, like all other physical things. This is very different from classical 
Cartesian dualism which is super-naturalistic - the human being, unlike all other physical enti-
ties, is an immaterial unextended soul stuff which is linked somehow with a quantity of 
extended matter. In any event, Aristotle's naturalistic metaphysical psychology was thoroughly 
lacking in detailed articulation of the form (of matter) that is the human soul. It is exactly this 
deficiency which has been made good (on a grand scale) by the last fifty years of information 
theoretic investigations of human psychology and neurophysiology. 
5 A complex system is one in which the parts of the system are structurally and functionally 
related to other parts, either directly or indirectly. The degree of complexity of a system is pro-
portionate to the degree of interconnectedness of the elements. In systems with the highest 
degrees of complexity, every part is directly connected with or functionally related to every 
other element of the system. The activity of a whole complex system is a function of the 
activity of the parts that make it up and vice versa (Kauffman, 1993; Minsky, 1985). 
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The Complex Bodily Nature of Human Beings 
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ments are organized into larger scale groupings which are organized into yet 
larger scale sets, etc. through an ordered hierarchy of levels of scale up to the 
organized whole of the central and peripheral nervous systems. Units on any 
level of scale are functionally connected to units on other levels of scale -
the activity of one mass of neurons is caused by the activity of some other 
mass of neurons and in tum precipitates activity in yet other masses of neu-
rons.6 If even as few as ten neurons operate as a functional unit and ten of 
these units act as a functional cluster and ten clusters function as a set etc., 
then all 100,000,000,000 neurons can be ordered into a functional whole 
well before the twelfth iteration of such a structuring scheme (cf., Minsky, 
1985). This very roughly indicates the number oflevels offunctional scale in 
the nervous system. The grouping of neurons into these functional units 
undergoes continuous change - the activity of a neuron (or mass of neu-
rons) will contribute to the functional activity of different masses of neurons 
over time. Some of these functional groupings are permanent and are either 
innate or formed early in life. Other groupings are temporary and are formed 
on an as-needed basis. The individual neurons organized into these systems 
exist within a range of activation states which lead up to electro-chemical 
outputs to other neurons and both the state and output of each neuron is a 
function of electro-chemical inputs from other neurons. When the system as 
a whole is active, the dynamical complexity is inconceivably great. This 
dynamical complexity is the form or pattern of the electro-chemical activity 
of the interconnected neurons over time (Diaz, 1997). Just as the static struc-
ture of the nervous system as a whole consists of individual neurons con-
nected into groupings which in their tum are grouped into units, so too the 
activity of individual neurons is related to the activity of other neurons so as 
to form active functional groupings. Activity of a group on one functional 
level is related to activity of other groupings at that same level of scale and 
to activity of units on other levels of scale. The highest level of functional 
scale is simply the activation of the whole nervous system and the form of 
this mass activity is the temporal pattern of the spatial pattern of all individ-
ual neuron firings. 7 This dynamical spatio-temporal pattern of activity of the 
whole nervous system contains within itself relatively distinct functional 
sub-patterns of neural activity on various levels of scale. Because of this fea-
ture, the nervous system can possess two functional abilities that are required 
6Edelman and Giulo ( 1998) developed a formalized criterion for determining whether or not a 
mass of neural activity is a functional unit. 
7Features of the temporal pattern include the order, periodicity, duration and frequency of 
neuron activity. Features of the spatial pattern include the shape, size, and location of neural 
firing. 
............---
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for self determined action, to wit, the capacities for being aware of the envi-
ronment and for being conscious of one's own states and activities.8 
How the Nervous System Could Possess the Capacities 
for Awareness and Self Consciousness 
If one of the aforementioned sub-patterns of neural activity, born within 
the mass of activity of the whole, were systematically caused to occur by 
something other than the nervous system itself (by the thing acting on the 
sense organs, for instance) then the occurrence of and structure of that sub-
pattern of neural activity would correlate with the occurrence of and structure 
of the object in the environment. This would amount to a correlation between 
two information locations or between two information structures (Dretske, 
1983). This correlation would be intentional - the information state in the 
organism (the neural sub-pattern) would be about the information state in 
the environs (the object) - if three further conditions obtained. First, the 
neural pattern would have to be caused by the object in the proper way, that 
is, efficiently and formally (Dretske, 1983; Sayre, 1986). Second, the neural 
pattern would have to structure the actions of the organism vis-a-vis that 
object (Dretske, 1994; Millikan, 1984 ). Third, the neural pattern would have 
to be further correlated with the information structure that is the spatial 
location of the sense organs and that spatial information structure would also 
have to be contained within the organism (Pestana, 2000). If these condi-
tions were fulfilled then the relation between a pattern of neural activity and 
some object in the environment would be intentional.9 In this way, the 
human nervous system could possess a capacity that is analogous to, and pos-
sibly identical with, awareness of the environment. If the activity of this 
same system were also fractal-like then it could possess a comparable capacity 
for self consciousness. 10 
8! use the term awareness to refer to first order acts of mind, that is, acts which have as their 
object extra-mental realities. I use the term consciousness to refer to second order acts of 
mind, that is, acts which have as their object first order acts of mind. This usage parallels the 
medieval distinction between first and second intentions (Poinsot, 1632/1985, pp. 48-76) and 
is similar to that employed by Armstrong (1968, chapter six, section nine), Rosenthal (1986) 
and Chalmers ( 1996, chapter six, part two). 
9For problems with this causal-physical interpretation of the "intentionality of the mental" 
see Fodor, 1984; Loewer, 1987. 
10! am grateful to Jeff Koperski for clarifying the distinction between "fractal," a pure geomet-
rical object or property, and "fractal-like," a property of a physical object that instantiates to a 
degree the property of iterated self-similarity. Compare this distinction with that between 
circle and circular (Koperski, 1997). Vandervert (1995) proffers suggestive remarks concern-
ing the fractalization of neural patterns, but does not develop them. 
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As is well known, fractals are geometrical forms which contain or bear 
within themselves, at multiple locations and at different levels of scale, other 
forms, which in turn bear within themselves, again at multiple locations and 
at different levels of scale, other forms and so on, without mathematical 
limit. Fractals can also bear within themselves, again at multiple locations, 
forms of themselves. In fact, this iterated self-similarity has been regarded as 
a defining feature of fractals " .... possessing symmetry across scale, with 
each part of the object replicating the structure of the whole" (Addison, 
1997, p. 2). A pattern of neural activity would be spatially self-similar if the 
neurons that are firing simultaneously form in space a pattern that replicates 
within itself at smaller levels of scale the spatial structure of the whole. A 
pattern of neural activity would be temporally self-similar if the neurons that 
fire form a pattern over an interval of time in which are replicated over 
shorter durations the structure of the whole period (as with a melody in 
which a phrase is iterated within itself). Clearly, a firing pattern. could be 
both spatially and temporally self-similar (Moon, 1992, pp. 401-406). This 
pattern would bear within itself forms of neural activity on smaller levels of 
scale that were identical to forms of its own activity on larger levels. If the 
pattern of the highest functional order of activity in the nervous system as a 
whole were fractal-like then the global activity of the nervous system would 
exhibit self-similarity. Furthermore, neural activity at the fractalized highest 
functional order could contain sub-forms of activity (information states) that 
were about that highest functional order (global information state), if 
causal/intentional relations existed between the iterations of self-similar pat-
terns of neuron firing. In this way, the human nervous system could possess a 
capacity that is analogous to, and possibly identical with, self conscious-
ness.11 In addition to this functional ability (and the capacity for awareness), 
11Self consciousness cannot be just a matter of one part of the brain monitoring another part 
of the brain (as in Johnson-Laird, 1983 ). Even if one part of the nervous system monitored 
another part and yet a third part of the system monitored the relation between the first two 
parts etc., the final monitoring system in any such series would have to he capable of monitor-
ing itself. Otherwise, the system as a whole would not be capable of receiving information 
about itself as a whole since it could not receive information from or about that final monitor 
system. The definitive feature of self consciousness is that it is self-iterative, I can think about 
my thinking about my thinking about .... Of course, there are subjective limits to these self 
reflections. Note, in this vein, that the self-similar sub-patterns contained within a global 
self-similar pattern of activity in the nervous system necessarily would each have reduced 
information content. In any physical fractal-like object there is a loss of information at each 
iteration of self-similarity because the iterations use up elements until there are simply not 
enough left to further carry the pattern. Perhaps it is this loss of information with successive 
iterations that is being phenomenologically manifested when people experience their own 
incapacity to carry out, beyond three or four iterations, acts of self reflection. 
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self determined action requires the capacities for acting to bring about 
desired changes in the environment and for acting to bring about desired 
changes in oneself. How could the human nervous system possess these addi-
tional powers? 
How the Nervous System Could Possess the 
Capacity for Self Determined Action 
In the case of awareness of the environment, the direction of causality is 
from the world to the person and in the case of self consciousness, the direc-
tion is from parts of the person to the whole person. In human action, this 
"direction of fit" or "fulfillment" is reversed (Searle, 1983, pp. 7-13 and more 
recently, 1998, pp. 100-103). When she acts, a person causes her environ-
ment to conform to her mind. This activity is a function of the person's 
desire for an outcome, her belief that the activity will lead to the outcome 
and a consequent desire to engage in that behavior. Whether or not any spe-
cific desire to act results in behavior depends on the interaction of a multi-
plicity of co-existing conflicting desires to act (derived from a comparable 
multiplicity of desires for outcomes). An individual might not sense these 
desires at all or might vaguely experience them as felt urges or might quite 
self consciously identify and name them. In any event, self determined action 
is possible only when the agent is conscious of her impulses to act. The tran-
sition from being conscious of a multiplicity of these desires to actual behav-
ior occurs when the person attends to one desire to the exclusion of others. 
In short, action follows upon a person focusing her consciousness intensely 
on a specific desire to act. 12 This appears phenomenologically as losing one-
self in or becoming completely absorbed by the object of attention, which in 
this case is a deed to be performed. Behavior that occurs in this way is self 
determined in the sense that it is the person who attends to her own desire to 
act. Furthermore, since the agent attends to her desire to act as cause of her 
behavior, the resultant behavior is self-referentially caused. Obviously, in the 
spontaneity conception of the will's freedom, the act of attending to a desire 
to act is itself regarded as caused by that desire (Bricklin, 1999). According 
to the indifference conception, the attending would be uncaused (how this is 
possible will be addressed in the next section). 
12Many philosophers and psychologists have analyzed willing as a function of attention, for 
example, Bricklin, 1999; James, 1890/1952; Lindworsky, 1929; Schwartz, 1999; see also Eccles, 
1990. 
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Now, the action of any complex physical system, which is caused by itself, 
is a function of the activities of its parts. 13 These internal activities maintain 
the system in a "quasi-stationary steady state" of energy exchanges with its 
environment (von Bertalanffy, 1968). By a continuous process of assimilating 
usable energy from the environs and returning, as a by product, used up 
energy to the environs, complex physical systems like organisms maintain 
themselves in existence (precisely as such things). The dynamical process is 
only quasi-stationary because it changes as the organic system grows, devel-
ops, decays and dies. Obviously, during periods of growth there is a balance of 
assimilation over dissimilation and during decay the reverse obtains. Thus, 
organisms can increase their own internal order (increase the amount of 
information they embody) in these operations. Actually, organic systems 
always maintain themselves at a higher level of order (lower level of entropy) 
than obtains within their surroundings and do so at an expense of order 
(increase in entropy) in their environs. Hence, an organism is "far from 
[thermodynamic] equilibrium" with its environment, as Prigogine (1984, 
pp.140-145) has recently emphasized. Nonetheless, there must still be a cor-
rect rate of exchange between the system and its surroundings in order for 
the system to be in this dissipative relation. When disruption of the correct 
rate occurs, by internal or external causes, the system is disposed to return 
itself to its proper rate. 14 The general neural functioning of human beings 
maintains this type of exchange between the organism and its environs. 
Patterns of nerve cell activity that are induced by disruptions of the correct 
rate lead the nervous system back into a pattern of overall activity in which 
it sustains a proper relation with the environment. This end state acts as an 
attractor ("final" cause) in the phase space of the ongoing activities of the 
nervous system (Horgan and Tienson, 1992). In this way, the dispositions of 
nervous system activity to move the whole system of activity into the prop-
13Here I follow up on the analysis given by Vandervert (I 995) in the appendix of his article 
and on Kane's ( 1994) suggestions. The issue here is a special case of the problem in classical 
metaphysics of the relation between efficient and formal causality. The sequence of neural fir· 
ings is a patterned sequence of forms. The most basic form of any movement through various 
(information) states of a system is a trajectory toward the lowest energy state of the system. In 
complex organic systems, this tendency is locally reversed. 
14Deviations from the dissipative steady state (caused by environmental impact or by internal 
forces) can occur by excess. That is, the system is put into a pattern of activity in which it 
accumulates more energy from the environment than it can convert to structure or discharge 
into the environment (and at its particular stage of development this is deleterious to its self 
maintenance). This is comparable to, or even identical with, a drive or impulse which induces 
behaviors which succeed in discharging the accumulation. Disruption of the dissipative steady 
state of exchange can also occur by deficiency. That is, the system is put into a pattern of 
activity by which it discharges more energy than it accumulates or loses structure. That is 
comparable to, or identical with, a need or want which leads to behavior which succeeds in 
replenishing the system. 
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erly proportioned rate of exchange with its environment are at least compa-
rable to and possibly even identical with desires. 
Most of the time multiple causes are disrupting the normal relation between 
the nervous system and its environs and are thereby inducing a multiplicity of 
patterns of nerve activity each of which would tend to rectify that relation. 
Accordingly, the distinct neural patterns that are a person's desires interfere, 
sum or interact in some manner to produce behavior. The strongest desire is 
that tendency induced in the whole system of nervous activity by the greatest 
deviation from the proper rate of dissipative exchange. When a strong ten-
dency enters consciousness, the global self-similar pattern of neural activity 
bears a sub-pattern that is caused by and is a pattern of the strongest disposi-
tion of the whole system to adjust some severe deviation from its steady state. 
If the person is conscious of possible courses of action that would satisfy her 
strongest desire then this self-similar neural pattern bears within itself sub-
patterns of possible future sequences of activity of the whole nervous system 
that would lead to the adjusted state. Self determined action occurs when a 
specific antecedent sub-pattern of neural activity (that is consciousness of a 
disposition to rectify, by a possible behavior, a disruption of the steady state 
within the organism) comes to be instantiated in activity of the nervous 
system as a whole (which would be the person acting to rectify that deviation 
from steady state). In other words, when a person attends so intensely to a 
possible course of action that behavior actually ensues, the global self-similar 
pattern of neural activity that is awareness of the environs and consciousness 
of the self takes on a pattern that is the deed performed (which pattern the 
self-similar system previously bore at a lower level of scale). 
All of this indicates how a physical system could be self determining (but 
cf. Searle, 1983, chapter ten). However, it is not clear how actions self deter-
mined in this way could be radically free. 
How Nervous System Activity Could be Radically Free 
According to the conception of the will's freedom as causal indifference 
between options, human beings are capable of action that is brought about 
by the person, yet is not determined to occur (is freely brought about). The 
latter characteristic entails that, at least, some of the actions of the human 
body must be indeterminate. 
An indeterministic system is one in which the system's previous states do 
not completely determine its subsequent states. This means that if two inde-
terministic systems begin in precisely identical states then it is possible for 
any subsequent states of the two systems to be quite different. In other words, 
the previous states are not necessary and sufficient conditions for a specific 
subsequent state to the exclusion of other possible subsequent states. An 
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antecedent state determines a set of possible subsequent states and thus is 
necessary and sufficient for whichever one of those (possible) subsequent 
states actually obtains. A deterministic system is one in which subsequent 
states are completely determined by previous ones. If two deterministic sys-
tems begin in exactly the same state then any of their subsequent states will 
be exactly the same. Previous states are necessary and sufficient for the subse-
quent state that obtains and no other subsequent states are possible. 15 
Twentieth century science has conclusively demonstrated that at the level 
of fundamental constituents of the universe, determinism does not obtain. 16 
This appeared to open up the possibility that the traditional theory of a radi-
cally free will might not contradict our physical theories (but see Eddington, 
1958 and Jeans, 1943). If the building blocks of the universe do not behave 
deterministically then perhaps human beings who are composed of such blocks 
do not behave deterministically either (Harkevy, 1995; Margenau, 1967). 
The problem with this idea was that the micro indeterminism of elements 
in any physical system seemed to cancel out in the aggregation of elements 
into a macro level system. Thus, in spite of micro level indeterminism it 
appeared that determinism still held at the level of scale at which cognitive 
and volitive information processing occurs. This is the position of those who 
reject the concept of radically free willing (for instance, Dennett, 1984 and, 
so it seems, Searle, 1998). More recent developments in complex systems 
theory provide a way of understanding how micro indeterminism might not 
be aggregated out of existence at macro levels of scale. My account of this 
begins at the micro level. 
Eccles (1953, 1994) has claimed experimental evidence that the firing of a 
neuron can be an indeterministic event. He postulates that neuron output is 
indeterministic when it has been "critically poised," just at the threshold of 
sparking an output, by the previous inputs it has received from other neurons. 
It follows that if two neurons are in identical critically poised states then, 
with identical inputs to each, it might happen that one sparks an output while 
15 A chaotic system is one which is "sensitive to initial conditions." This means that two 
chaotic systems in minutely different initial states will most likely be in different subsequent 
states. The more chaotic are the systems, the more sensitive they are to initial conditions and 
the more rapidly will occur the divergence between their subsequent states (assuming again 
some slight differences between their initial states). It is generally held that chaotic systems 
are deterministic, but see Kellen (1993, chapter three) and Polkinghome (1998, pp. 63-66). 
16I assume the "no hidden variables" position. It seems that the majority of physicists regard the 
indeterminism of quantum mechanics as descriptive of reality. That is, the dynamical properties 
of objects at very small levels of scale are indeterminate in their actual being (at least until some 
act of observation or measurement determines the property). Here I rely on Capek (1961, chap-
ter XVI). Herbert's (1985) popularization contains an accessible exposition of the various inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics and of the problems of the hidden variables approach. 
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the other does not. Only some neuron firings occur indeterministically in 
this fashion - a neuron that has been pushed by inputs far beyond the 
threshold is determined to fire by those inputs. In a sense, Eccles is claiming 
that some neurons (perhaps those with massive connections) on some occa-
sions (when they have been critically poised to fire) act as quantum percola-
tors, percolating indeterministic actions at the atomic level of scale and 
smaller up to the level of scale of very large molecules. Several sources of this 
indeterminism in neuron firing have been postulated (Kane, 1994; Penrose, 
1994; but see Wilson, 1999). Eccles (1986) himself claims that it is due to the 
quantized nature of the emission of neurotransmitters from vesicles at the 
synaptic cleft. Whatever the source, if Eccles is correct about this (occasional) 
indeterminism of neural action then another indeterminism percolator is still 
needed to bring this micro indeterminism up to the level of action by the 
whole person. This is where complexity theory enters the picture. 
Recall, a complex system is one in which the activity of the whole is a 
function of the activity of the parts and the action of every part is a function 
of the action of many other parts (the parts are highly functionally con-
nected with each other). Kane, quoting Globus, describes the complex func-
tioning of the nervous system as follows: 
The operation of such networks is holistic in the sense that, as Gordon Globus puts it, 
"the influence of the whole net [of neurons affects each] individual node [each 
neuron] and the influence of the individual node [affects] the whole net." As a conse-
quence, such networks can be sensitive to variations of firings of individual neurons. 
As Globus says, "Make a few changes in the connection weights [the excitatory and 
inhibitory potentials of neurons] and functionally everything changes [in the neural 
network] via non-linear interactions ... the net spontaneously and probabilistically 
self-organizes." 17 (Kane, 1994, p. 47) 
Because the indeterminism of a neuron is a function of its general internal 
state which, in turn, is a function of its inputs from other neurons (the 
action of many of which may be indeterminate), any indeterminism in the 
output of an individual neuron would be functionally related to indetermin-
ism in the activity of other neurons. Therefore, due to the high degree of 
interconnectedness of the elements of the nervous system, it is possible that 
indetermination in the action of parts need not get canceled out in the aggre-
11James Garson has argued as follows: "Chaotic systems are, by definition, perturbation ampli-
fiers. They can override the general rule that quantum mechanical indeterminacies cancel 
out at the macro-level" (quoted in Kane, 1994, p. 46). This is misleading. The nervous system 
"overrides the general rule" because the neurons are functionally and massively intercon-
nected- the nervous system is a complex system. Not all complex systems behave chaotically 
(nor are all systems that behave chaotically, complex). Even if the brain did not behave as a 
chaotic system, quantum mechanical indeterminacies could still percolate up through the 
mass of interconnected neurons. 
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gating of those constituent activities into the behavior of the whole. In fact, 
the system as a whole might be more indeterminate in its functioning than in its 
parts - the probability that a single critically poised neuron will fire might 
be multiplied by the probabilities of firing of all the other critically poised 
neurons with which it is connected. Thus, functional aggregations of neurons 
could exhibit a high degree of indetermination in their massed action. 
It seems possible that transitions from specific antecedent sub-patterns of 
neural activity to subsequent instantiations of those patterns by the nervous 
system as a whole, that is, self determination, could occur in this indetermin-
istic manner. This would mean that a pattern of nerve activity that was the 
person's consciousness that doing X would satisfy her desire for D would 
deterministically cause both the set of neurons, the firing of which would be 
her doing X and the set of neurons, the firing of which would be her not 
doing X (the act of omission), to enter the critically poised state. The agent's 
actually doing X (or omitting to do X) would be determined to occur neither 
by her desire to do X (or to omit doing X) nor by her consciousness of the 
action's relation to her desire. Only the potentiality for doing or not doing X 
would be deterministically activated or, more generally, only the set of possi-
ble states of activity into which the nervous system could evolve would be 
determined by the history of the actual states of the system. 18 
Of course, if the nervous system were critically poised in this way, it is 
determinate that it would transit into some next pattern. Energy would flow 
through the system and the current global information state would be followed 
by some other global information state. So too, according to the conception 
of the will as radically free, in any situation of choice, it is determinate that 
the person will do something. At a minimum the agent either will choose to 
do X or she will choose to omit X. 
Moreover, if the nervous system operated in this indeterministic fashion 
then its probabilistic transitions would obey laws of distribution, as in any 
quantum mechanical system, and, accordingly, would be explicable and pre-
dictable in the mass. So too, radically free actions are taken to be explicable 
and predictable in the mass (Campbell, 1967). In this conception offree will 
it is conceded that desires incline a person to will, that there are determinate 
causes of those desires and that people tend to choose in accord with their 
strongest desires (Donagan, 1987, pp. 170-171). Thus, different sets of very 
large numbers of choices between action X and action Y, where X is desired 
more than Y, could yield the same distributions between the two choices. To 
18This would be a special case of the evolution of a quantum mechanical system as determined 
by its initial conditions and the Schrodinger equation (Mohrhoff, 1999, p. 174; Stapp, 1999, 
p. 157). In psychological terms, the history of a person's choices (of which motives determine 
his actions) determines the strength of and content of his motives in the future (Hodgson, 
1999, p. 206). 
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this extent freely willed actions fall within ranges of explicability and pre-
dictability (and the utter randomness that Jeans and Eddington feared is 
greatly curtailed). 
Nevertheless, in all quantum systems, lawlike distributions in the mass still 
leave individual actions or events indeterminate (Compton, 1935, pp. 62-63; 
Frank, 1957, chapter ten). In other words, though the earlier state of a quan-
tum mechanical system is both necessary and sufficient for whichever of its 
later possible states actually occurs, there is no sufficient cause for one subse-
quent state X to be realized instead of some other. In the conception of the will 
as radically free, reasons (belief and desire sets) do account for or explain an 
act. To the question, "Why did you do X?," the response can be proffered, 
"Because I thought that doing X would cause state of affairs D and I wanted 
D more than anything else." However, if this questioning continues with, 
"But why did you do what led to D when you could have done something else 
instead, even if that would have led to a less desired state of affairs?," then no 
response can be forthcoming. There is no reason that accounts for, no expla-
nation for (and no sufficient cause of) the actual course of conduct to the 
exclusion of some other possible course. 
Those who reject radical freedom of will either reject this as nonsense 
(Dennett, 1984) or explain it in terms of non-conscious mechanisms that can 
cause a person to behave contrary to conscious motivations (Davidson, 
1980a, 1982; Smith, 1999). Those who endorse radically free agency regard 
people as not determined by their desires and hence as able to act contrary to 
what they most want or have the best reason for doing. According to this 
conception of free will, then, there remains an ineradicable element of inex-
plicability and unpredictability in human action (Campbell, 1967, pp. 45-49; 
Donagan, 1987)_19 This mysteriousness would be the mysteriousness of quan-
19What adaptive value would a capacity for inexplicable action confer on its possessor? I will 
only briefly mention several responses to this question proffered by others. McCrone (1999, 
pp. 254-256) argues that the self determination of action would be selected for to the extent 
that it was adaptively advantageous for responses to be freed from control by the environ-
ment. Claxton (1999, p. 109) argues that the indetermination of action weakens the link 
between conditioning and response. This in turn allows for a form of highly advantageous 
"retarded cognizing" about future actions by which the organism is not precipitated into 
action. The practical syllogism only results in a probability state concerning the next act of 
the organism and in this last moment (just before the will is exercised) further last minute 
information processing can occur. Brown (1999, p. 28) argues that indeterminism in the link 
between conditioning and response allows for radically innovative, even mutational, 
responses. Structures that gave the capacity for indeterminate action would be selected for to 
the extent that they occasioned novel, flexible and creative responses to the environment 
that were more advantageous than those conferred by other structures. Finally, as Dennett 
(1984, pp. 66-73) indicates, the severing of determinate links between conditioning and 
response makes behavior unpredictable by competitors or by prey. A quantum mechanical 
randomizer of behavior would be selected for to the extent that it served (better than other 
mechanisms) to protect the organism in this manner. 
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tum mechanics (coupled with oddities of fractal self-similar geometries), if 
indeterminacies at the smallest levels of scale were being exhibited and expe-
rienced at the macro level. 
This interpretation shows how a macroscopic material system could 
exhibit the indeterminism required for radically free will. The problem now 
is that the interpretation appears to contradict the previous account of how a 
physical system could be self determining in the manner required in this con-
ception of will. 
The solution to this dilemma depends on a critical difference between the 
indeterminism of the micro level neurons and the percolated up indetermin-
ism of the nervous system as a whole. The whole human being is a structure 
that contains information about itself, that is, about its current, previous and sub-
sequent (possible) states. A critically poised nervous system would determi-
nately specify the range of these subsequent possible states. Accordingly, that 
critically poised state would be both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the subsequent state which actually obtained. If this system of neurons were 
globally self-similar in its activity then any one of those subsequent states 
would contain information about its own previous critically poised state (in 
which it had been carried as a future possibility). Hence, the actual subse-
quent state of the system would contain information to the effect that the 
previous (critically poised) state of the system had been necessary and suffi-
cient for the subsequent state to occur. But this means that the subsequent 
pattern of neural activity in a globally self-similar system that had been criti-
cally poised would contain information about its current state as caused by its 
own previous state. To put this point (clumsily) in quantum mechanical 
terms, if the activity of the nervous system as a whole contains information 
about its own "superposition" of possible states then the system as a whole 
can be regarded as bringing about the "collapse of its own wave function.',zo 
Nothing would cause a person to collapse her own wave function, she would 
not be caused to attend to any specific possible act by her desire to so act. 
And yet, this act of attending would not just be a matter of probabilities, 
would not just occur "by the odds," since she would realize that probability 
20This formulation makes evident the extent to which my interpretations go beyond what is 
conventionally considered in physics for in this case a quantum mechanical system includes 
within itself the observer of the system. It is important to emphasize that so regarding the 
whole system (the person) as the cause of its entering into a subsequent state does not entail 
altering the probabilities of what will occur. Mohrhoff (1999, section IV) quite convincingly 
demonstrates that if the probabilities were so altered then laws of nature would be violated, 
specifically the characterization of the evolution of quantum systems according to the 
Schrodinger equation. Obviously, if I attend to one action possibility to the exclusion of the 
others then the probability for that event is changed (to unity). But this does not alter the 
probability distribution before I so attend. 
-----
INDETERMINISM, COMPLEXITY AND FREE WILL 383 
and could have realized an other. This combination of self referential causal-
ity and indeterminism is precisely radically free willing. 
Empirical Evidence and Summation 
The conception of the will as radically free accords with the intuitions 
that we determine our own actions, that our acts are not caused by anything 
else and that we are always able to choose otherwise. If the human nervous 
system operates in the "indeterministic self determining" manner described 
in the previous sections then we have such intuitions precisely because we 
work that way. 
Though there are these congruencies between our intuitions, the concept 
of free agency and my speculations about operating modes of the nervous 
system, the exercise of radically free willing would be empirically unde-
tectable. 21 Inducing a subject to alter the probability distribution of his 
future possible actions by exercising his free will (and thereby detecting dif-
ferent effects of the operation of the power), would itself change the proba-
bilities. Suppose my life history results in a .2 probability for my freely doing 
X in some circumstance. That means that as this type of situation is 
repeated, the number of my actual choices of X approaches 20% of the total 
choices I make (in those circumstances). Further suppose that I want to alter 
this distribution in order to prove that I have free will (and can choose X 
more often). Well, that very want would change the probability of my doing 
X to begin with. Hence, there would be no way of detecting the selection 
effect of my free self determining. 22 
Notwithstanding this empirical unverifiability, it appears that the tradi-
tional concept of the will as radically free can be quite consonant with our 
21 It appears that Libet's empirical work (as summarized in Libet, 1999) contradicts my specula-
tions. However, his experimental design fails to discriminate between intentions to act and the 
reports of those intentions. There can be differences between and time lags between the forming 
of an intention to act, putting that intention into words, and then uttering aloud those words. 
In addition, the design of his experiment fails to distinguish between intentions of varying 
degrees of determinateness. Even simple intentions can range in definitiveness from "I'm going 
to do something or other" to "I'm going to pull this lever here right now." As Donagan (1981) 
demonstrates, the history of the theory of human action has involved a progressive articulation 
of the concept of intention. Because Libet's experiment does not (cannot?) accommodate these 
articulations, it is simply impossible to tell with what the readiness potential is associated. 
22The ontological and epistemological status of the exercise of radically free will would be 
analogous to the action of the pilot wave in Bohm's conceptualization of quantum mechanics. 
The pilot wave is empirically undetectable and yet exerts causal influence (and accounts for 
the entanglement of particles). Of course, Bohm's pilot wave is an integral part of a rigorous 
and quantified theory (to wit, his version of quantum mechanics). At this stage in the devel-
opment of our understanding of how the brain functions, the notion of radically free agency 
only "loosely" accounts for our self experience. 
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understanding of the universe as achieved by the sciences of physics and 
biology. In terms of contemporary complexity theory human beings can be 
understood as self determining, if the nervous system contains patterns of its 
own subsequent possible total states on the basis of which it enters into those 
states. By the addition of quantum mechanics, humans can be viewed as radi-
cally free in this self determining, if entering into any one of those subse-
quent states of the nervous system is not necessarily determined to occur. As 
Duns Scotus claimed, this type of agency would be sui generis- exhibited in 
the universe only by highly complex, self similar, and indeterministic physi-
cal systems. 23 
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